Following the 1971 Indo-Pak war and the subsequent Shimla Agreement, India and Pakistan entered a prolonged phase of uneasy peace. The war, which culminated in the creation of Bangladesh, left Pakistan militarily weakened and politically fragile. In the ensuing years, Islamabad remained apprehensive about potential Indian offensives—particularly regarding Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK), further disintegration due to the 1973 Baloch insurgency led by nationalist Khair Bux Marri, and possible Indian advances into Punjabi towns where Sikh holy sites are located. In this context, India has consistently faced Pakistani diplomatic blackmail.
The strategic dynamics of South Asia shifted dramatically in the 1980s with the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Pakistan gained importance for the U.S., NATO, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab states as a staging ground for the proxy war against the Soviet-backed Afghan government. During this period, Pakistan received massive military and financial aid, rebuilding its defeated military. This conflict became the crucible for low-cost, ideology-driven proxy warfare under the banner of jihad. Drawing heavily from this experience, Pakistan under General Zia-ul-Haq institutionalized the doctrine of “bleeding India with a thousand cuts”—a prolonged campaign of asymmetric warfare utilizing state-sponsored militant groups.
Over time, this doctrine evolved into a structured strategy involving well-trained operatives—often backed by Pakistan’s Border Action Teams (BAT)—to infiltrate Indian territory and carry out high-impact attacks on civilian and military targets. India’s response largely centered on gathering evidence, engaging in diplomatic forums, and appealing to the international community—measures that proved ineffective and emboldened terrorists to continue attacks. These efforts had limited deterrent effect, failing to curb the proxy war waged from across the border and deep inside India.
India has paid a heavy price for Pakistan’s proxy war. From the 2008 Mumbai attacks to the more recent Uri, Pulwama, and Pahalgam incidents, and within a single week the Delhi Red Fort blast and the Srinagar Police Station blast in Kashmir—both causing significant casualties—a clear pattern of cross-border terrorism has emerged. Despite presenting compelling evidence to the international community, India’s restrained approach has not deterred aggression.
The paradigm shifted with Operation Sindoor—a well-coordinated strike targeting terrorist infrastructure and command centers deep within Pakistani territory. Notably, India provided prior notice to Pakistan, a miscalculation that allowed Pakistani forces to mobilize, prepare, and intercept Indian jets. This led to the loss of several Indian fighter aircraft, as acknowledged by military officials. The Pakistan Army did not remain neutral; it became a direct participant in the conflict. Consequently, the brief 2025 war reinforced a critical strategic truth: Pakistan is no longer a mere sponsor but an active participant in this proxy war against India.
Although a ceasefire was later declared, India made it unequivocally clear that Operation Sindoor was only paused. Any future terrorist attack in India would be treated as an act of war by Pakistan, not merely the work of non-state actors. This declaration has changed the strategic calculus. Notably, the Baloch people expressed disappointment with the ceasefire, hoping India would continue destroying Pakistani military bases. They argued that sustained hostilities might have further eroded Pakistan’s military presence, particularly in Balochistan. In support of India, the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) escalated its operations, striking military targets with increased intensity. However, following the ceasefire, the Pakistani state launched a brutal crackdown in Balochistan, branding nationalists and secular fighters as “Fitnat’ul-Hindustan”—alleged collaborators with India.
On 10 November 2025, a terrorist attack at Delhi’s Red Fort, followed by the 15 November 2025 Srinagar Police Station blast that killed both law enforcement personnel and civilians, further underscored the threat to Indian national security. Reports suggest the Red Fort attackers were planning a major strike on key Indian military installations, but the blast was triggered prematurely. Otherwise, this would have been a catastrophic attack with mass casualties. Similarly, in Srinagar, a major terrorist operation was being prepared against the Indian Army, but the premature blast nonetheless dealt a severe blow to law enforcement institutions in Kashmir.
Additionally, to avoid Indian strikes on major cities such as Karachi, Lahore, Islamabad, and military assets in POK, Pakistan appears to be executing a risky multi-objective maneuver at Sir Creek. Reports indicate a significant military buildup near Sir Creek, including forward bases, bunkers, radar installations, infantry units, and enhanced naval capabilities such as patrol vessels and marine assault boats—designed for modern guerrilla warfare. The objective is to provoke Indian retaliation by targeting cities like Mumbai, Gujarat, and Ahmedabad, while disrupting critical infrastructure such as refineries and oil production facilities near these new Pakistani deployments.
India may be forced to deploy expensive weaponry against low-cost Pakistani positions in the deserts of Sindh, resulting in a strategic diversion. This maneuver could shift the conflict away from POK and Punjab toward sparsely populated regions, allowing Pakistan’s major cities and military assets to remain shielded. Under international diplomatic pressure, India might be compelled to de-escalate, risking economic losses and energy disruptions in its urban centers. Regardless, the incident highlights the urgency for India to resume Operation Sindoor.
Strategic Imperatives
- Doctrine Overhaul: India must fundamentally revise its national security doctrine. Drawing inspiration from nations such as Israel, decisive and proportionate retaliation should become the cornerstone of policy. Direct targeting of military assets—bases, ammunition depots, and airfields—must replace limited strikes on infrastructure. Failure to respond decisively to the Red Fort attack and Srinagar blasts will embolden Pakistan and render Operation Sindoor 1.0 ineffective.
- Sir Creek Maneuver: India must not ignore Pakistan’s buildup at Sir Creek. Neutralizing Pakistani positions through an offensive defense strategy is essential to safeguard sovereignty and economic assets.
- Operational Priorities: In any future conflict, India must prioritize striking Pakistan’s military installations and cantonments in major cities rather than expending resources in the deserts.
- India-Afghanistan Cooperation: India and Afghanistan should deepen military cooperation—sharing weapons, air defense systems, and coordinating through Operation Sindoor 2.0 to counter Pakistan on the eastern front.
- Reclaiming POK: India should prepare contingency plans, including expanding Operation Sindoor 2.0 to reclaim Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir before a potential Pakistani collapse.
- Nuclear Threats: If extremist groups such as the TTP seize control of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, the regional threat would escalate dramatically. Israel, the U.S., and Western powers must act preemptively to secure Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.
- Afghanistan & Balochistan Strategy: India has restored full diplomatic relations with Taliban-led Afghanistan. To increase leverage, India should formally recognize the Afghan Taliban, as Russia has done, and strengthen ties with Kabul. Additionally, New Delhi must engage with secular Baloch nationalists—especially the BLA—and support the creation of an independent Balochistan to bolster long-term regional security.
Conclusion
The Pakistan Army and planners of the Red Fort blast must not go unpunished; otherwise, Pakistan will be emboldened to carry out more attacks, undermining the effectiveness of Operation Sindoor. India reserves the right to retaliate for the Delhi Red Fort attack and must resume Operation Sindoor 2.0, striking Pakistan’s military assets with precision.
India should prepare contingency plans, including reclaiming Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir before a potential collapse of the Pakistani state, ensuring India becomes a contiguous neighbor of Afghanistan and gains direct access to Central Asian republics.
If extremist groups such as the TTP seize control of nuclear assets, the threat becomes exponentially more dangerous. The U.S. and Western powers must act to neutralize Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal before it falls into jihadist hands.
India should formally recognize the Afghan Taliban, as Russia has done, and deepen coordination with Kabul. New Delhi must also engage secular Baloch nationalists—especially BLA leadership—and support the establishment of a free, independent Balochistan. Simultaneously, India should encourage Afghanistan to absorb Pakistan’s Pashtun province (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), merging it into a Greater Afghanistan. This would secure long-term stability for both India and Afghanistan.
India has no option but to resume Operation Sindoor 2.0—in support of Greater Afghanistan, a free Balochistan, and for its own national security and lasting peace.
About the Author
Fatima Baloch is a senior geopolitical and regional expert who writes extensively on Afghanistan, Balochistan, and India, with a focus on strategic dynamics and regional security.
