When the Afghan Taliban captured Kabul on August 15, 2021, Pakistan celebrated. The Prime Minister, military officials, and other high-profile politicians declared it a victory for Pakistan. Yet continued attacks from Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the secular Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), combined with the Afghan–Pakistan clashes of October 14–15, 2025, quickly shifted the narrative. In the context of Afghanistan’s improving regional relations, Pakistan now labels the Afghan Taliban 2.0 government illegitimate, frequently using the propaganda term “regime” to imply foreign design and fabrication.
Islamabad refers to the US/NATO–Taliban Doha Agreement of February 29, 2020, arguing that Washington imposed this government on Afghanistan. At the same time, Pakistan recognizes the agreement and demands that Afghan soil not be used against it. Pakistan further claims the Taliban represent a Pashtun-majority government, excluding other ethnicities and lacking democratic legitimacy. This stance reflects Pakistan’s direct interference in Afghanistan’s domestic politics.
In reality, many of the Taliban’s top leadership positions—including Deputy Prime Ministers, the Chief of Army, and the Mayor of Kabul—are held by non-Pashtuns. For Pakistan, however, a strong, independent, and nationalist Afghanistan has long been perceived as a strategic threat. Islamabad fears that such a government could reignite Pashtun nationalism, revive calls for an independent Pashtunistan, challenge the Durand Line, and potentially support Baloch separatism—threatening Pakistan’s territorial integrity from both the west and the south.
Historically, Pakistan has exploited Afghan instability, backing insurgents and fueling civil wars. In the 1980s, it supported Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and other factions, deepening the devastating conflict of 1992–1994. Later, it facilitated the rise of Taliban 1.0, declaring Afghanistan its “strategic depth.” After 9/11, Pakistan became a frontline ally of the US/NATO against the Taliban, gaining Non-NATO ally status and substantial aid. Over two decades, Pakistan fought the Taliban under the “do more” policy while simultaneously providing military support, airbases, and logistics to NATO forces—resulting in thousands of Afghan deaths. During this period, the TTP emerged, ideologically aligned with the Afghan Taliban.
The Taliban’s return to power in 2021 emboldened the TTP to replicate their success and challenge the Pakistan Army. Today, nuclear-armed Pakistan faces converging internal and external threats reminiscent of 1971. In Balochistan, the secular Baloch nation continues its struggle for independence under the BLA, while the TTP has gained ground in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, defeating Pakistani forces and seeking to replace the pseudo-democratic Islamic Republic with a Taliban-style sharia government.
Afghanistan, despite decades of monarchy, communism, socialism, and externally imposed democracies, has not experienced peace for 45 years. Yet unlike previous regimes, the Taliban-led government has brought relative stability. Many Afghans perceive its governance model as aligned with their cultural and religious values. The Taliban have curbed corruption, restored law and order, and reasserted sovereignty—earning legitimacy and popular support, particularly in rural areas.
Thus, where foreign-engineered governments failed, the nationalist and Islamic-valued Afghan Taliban 2.0 stands as a legitimate authority. Indeed, the Taliban government appears more representative than Pakistan’s pseudo-democratic system, which is neither Islamic nor democratic. Under Taliban leadership, Afghanistan is undergoing rapid development—a trajectory that challenges Pakistan’s traditional security calculus. Desperately, Pakistan is once again seeking regime change to install a pro-Pakistan government.
Currently, Pakistan is losing against TTP and BLA insurgencies. Years of conflict and politicized leadership have left the military exhausted and ineffective, reminiscent of the Afghan National Army’s collapse under Ashraf Ghani. Seeking to internationalize its internal insurgencies, Pakistan turned to Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and China to establish an anti-TTP and BLA accord.
Pakistan has since closed trade routes with Afghanistan, cancelled Afghan transit at Karachi port, and on October 14–15, 2025, launched strikes across Afghanistan—including Kabul—aiming to force the Taliban to fight its war against the TTP. Qatar and Saudi Arabia brokered a ceasefire, leading to peace talks in Doha on October 18 and Istanbul on October 28, both of which failed.
During these talks, Pakistan’s ISI and military delegation demanded:
- Declaring a Fatwa that Pakistan is an Islamic Republic, thereby rendering TTP jihad impermissible.
- Relocating TTP and BLA fighters to western Afghan provinces.
- Ensuring Afghan soil is not used for insurgencies against Pakistan under the Doha Agreement.
The Taliban rejected these demands, clarifying that Fatwas are issued by the Supreme Council, not the Supreme Leader, and that the Doha Agreement was signed with the U.S., not Pakistan. They emphasized that TTP and BLA insurgencies are Pakistan’s internal matters, predating the Taliban’s return in 2021.
Pakistan withdrew from talks and launched a propaganda narrative portraying Afghanistan as a terrorist haven, accusing the Taliban of harboring ETIM, IMU, and ISIS-K. Yet these claims failed to gain traction, as regional powers—including China, Qatar, Iran, and Russia—strengthened economic ties with Afghanistan.
Peace talks collapsed. Today, Qatar, Turkey, Iran, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, China, and Russia recognize and support the Taliban government. Turkey, however, fears Pakistan’s collapse and the emergence of an independent Balochistan, which could resonate with Kurdish separatism.
Pakistan’s army is now desperately seeking Afghan factions and militant actors to fight against the Taliban-led government. Yet Afghans widely perceive Pakistan as untrustworthy, and no Afghan leaders have responded to its overtures. The Taliban, wary of U.S. influence and Pakistani interference, increasingly view support for the TTP’s Islamic, pro-Afghanistan agenda—and the Baloch struggle for a Greater Afghanistan (Loy Afghanistan)—as essential to safeguarding their sovereignty.
Conclusion
Turkey has once again stepped in to protect the Pakistan Army, pledging drones and ammunition against the TTP and BLA. Yet the Afghan Taliban remain unwilling to fight their ideological brethren, the TTP. Doing so risks internal divisions, public backlash, and even civil war—an outcome Pakistan may seek to exploit.
Meanwhile, Pakistan’s trade route blockade has accelerated India–Afghanistan economic ties. India is moving to establish industries and production centers in Afghanistan, supporting medicine manufacturing, healthcare infrastructure, and the construction of refineries and industrial facilities across multiple sectors. These initiatives will create jobs, reduce poverty, and strengthen Afghanistan’s economy.
India must also prepare contingency plans, including reclaiming Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) before a potential collapse of the Pakistani state. This would ensure India becomes a contiguous neighbor of Afghanistan and gains direct access to the Central Asian republics.
Strategically, India should formally recognize the Afghan Taliban—as Russia has already done—and deepen coordination with Kabul. New Delhi must engage secular Baloch nationalists, particularly BLA leadership, to support the establishment of a free, independent Balochistan. Simultaneously, India should encourage Afghanistan to absorb Pakistan’s Pashtun province (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), merging it into a Greater Afghanistan. Such steps would secure long-term stability for both India and Afghanistan.
Ultimately, India has no option but to resume Operation Sindoor 2.0—in support of Greater Afghanistan and a free Balochistan.
About the Author
Fatima Baloch is a senior geopolitical and regional expert who writes extensively on Afghanistan, Balochistan, and India, with a focus on strategic dynamics and regional security.
