The creation of Pakistan in 1947 was heavily influenced by the British colonial strategy of “divide and rule.” Rather than arising from a purely organic nationalist movement, Pakistan was born out of the partition of British India under the pretext of religion—specifically, the “Two-Nation Theory.” This division not only fractured the Indian subcontinent but also weakened Muslim political cohesion. The geopolitical repercussions of Pakistan’s formation extended beyond its borders, profoundly affecting neighboring Afghanistan. A significant portion of present-day Pakistan comprises territory historically considered part of Loya Afghanistan—Greater Afghanistan—including Balochistan and the Pashtun belt, which were traditionally Afghan lands.
The foundation of the Two-Nation Theory was later discredited when Pakistan disintegrated in 1971 and Bangladesh emerged as an independent state, casting doubt on the legitimacy of that ideological construct. One of the most contentious outcomes of Pakistan’s creation was the inclusion of Pashtun-majority regions along the Durand Line—a colonial-era border agreement signed in 1893 between British India and Afghanistan. Afghanistan never recognized this artificial boundary, viewing it as a temporary and unjust demarcation that arbitrarily divided Afghan and Pashtun ethnic populations between the two nations.
As a result, Afghanistan became the first country to refuse recognition of Pakistan at the United Nations. Afghan leaders feared that the partition, coupled with the Durand Line, would marginalize Pashtuns and undermine Afghan sovereignty over historically connected territories, resulting in the permanent loss of eastern Afghanistan occupied by Pakistan. For Pakistan, a strong, independent, and nationalist Afghanistan posed a strategic threat. Islamabad feared that such a government could reignite Pashtun nationalism—calling for an independent Pashtunistan or a merger with Afghanistan—challenge the legitimacy of the Durand Line, and potentially support Baloch separatism. This would threaten Pakistan’s territorial integrity both from the west (Pashtunistan) and the south (Balochistan).
In response, Pakistan adopted a long-standing policy of interference in Afghanistan’s internal affairs, exploiting nearly every phase of the country’s political instability. With backing from the United States, Saudi Arabia, and other Western allies during the Cold War, Pakistan played a central role in undermining successive Afghan governments. In the 1970s, Pakistan supported opposition groups against King Zahir Shah and later against President Daud Khan. It continued to meddle in Afghanistan’s internal politics, backing warring factions that brought destruction to Afghan society.
During the Soviet intervention (1979–1989), Pakistan served as a key conduit for U.S. and Saudi funding to the Mujahideen fighters, with multiple objectives: to earn dollars, acquire free U.S. weapons, and politically and militarily weaken Afghanistan—since a fragile Afghanistan favored Pakistan’s strategic interests. During this period, Pakistan received billions in U.S. aid, Saudi riyals, and vast quantities of military equipment and modern weaponry. Under the guise of refugee support, Pakistani generals and elites also profited immensely from UNHCR and global NGOs. Pakistan referred to every Afghan refugee as a “guest of Allah” and a “holy refugee,” intending to use these displaced families as proxy fighters against their own homeland. Tragically, many of these refugees—tribal, ill-educated, and vulnerable—were exploited by the Pakistani military, the U.S., and Saudi Arabia.
After the Soviet withdrawal in 1987 and the fall of the communist regime in 1992, Pakistan supported specific Mujahideen factions—particularly Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s—fueling a full-scale civil war that devastated a once well-developed Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the U.S., Saudi Arabia, and other powers abandoned the Afghan people, treating them like disposable assets.
In 1996, Pakistan backed the rise of the Taliban—an organization formed largely from students of Pakistani madrassas—who eventually seized control of most of Afghanistan, replacing Hekmatyar, Islamabad’s former protégé. During this period, Pakistan not only influenced political outcomes but also sought to reshape Pashtun identity—transforming many secular, moderate, and nationalist anti-Pakistan elements into religiously radicalized, pro-Pakistan forces. This served Islamabad’s strategic goals.
These interventions came at a devastating cost. Decades of war, foreign meddling, and civil strife destroyed Afghanistan’s infrastructure, displaced millions, and left deep psychological scars across generations. This history of manipulation fostered deep anger and resentment among Afghans toward Pakistan. Pakistan’s “strategic depth” doctrine—the idea of using influence over Afghan territory to secure its western flank—ensured that Afghanistan remained militarily weak, politically unstable, and dependent.
After the 9/11 attacks, Pakistan turned against the Afghan Taliban and allied with the U.S. and NATO in the global war on terror, gaining Non-NATO ally status and receiving substantial aid and development packages. Over the next two decades, Pakistan not only fought the Afghan Taliban under the “do more” policy but also provided military support, airbases, and logistics to NATO and U.S. forces—resulting in the deaths of thousands of Afghans. During this period, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) emerged, ideologically aligned with the Afghan Taliban.
Based on the above incidents, many Afghans today do not view Pakistan as a friendly neighbor but rather as a long-time manipulator of their national destiny. The repeated denial of Afghanistan’s sovereignty and identity has fueled enduring resentment, distrust, and hostility.
Following the Afghan Taliban 2.0’s return to power on August 15, 2021—under the Doha Agreement—the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) was emboldened to replicate the Taliban’s success and challenge the Pakistan Army. Today, nuclear-armed Pakistan faces a convergence of internal and external threats reminiscent of the fragmentation of 1971. In Balochistan, the secular Baloch nation continues its fight for independence under the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), seeking to establish a secular republic. Meanwhile, the TTP has gained significant ground in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), defeating Pakistani forces and aiming to replace the current pseudo-democratic Islamic Republic with an Afghan Taliban-style sharia government.
The April 10, 2022 vote of no-confidence against PTI and the imprisonment of its most popular civilian leader, Imran Khan, further destabilized the political landscape. The crackdown on Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP)—a previously favored hardline religious party used by the military to justify its actions in Balochistan and KPK—has alienated key segments of society. These developments have eroded public support for the Pakistan Army’s campaigns against the TTP and other militant groups. Simultaneously, Pakistan grapples with severe economic instability and political disarray.
Despite efforts to suppress the BLA and TTP insurgencies—suffering heavy casualties and the loss of high-ranking officers in routine ambushes—the Pakistan Army has failed. The grueling guerrilla campaigns have left the military exhausted and ineffective. The institution now teeters on collapse, reminiscent of the Afghan National Army’s downfall under Ashraf Ghani. If Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal falls into the hands of jihadist groups like the TTP, the global threat would be catastrophic—especially for India, Israel, and the United States.
In desperation, Pakistan launched a full-scale military campaign against Afghanistan on October 14–15, 2025, targeting civilian infrastructure and populations, and closing trade routes across the border—financially damaging Afghanistan’s war-torn economy and traders. The objective: to force Kabul to fight Pakistan’s war against the TTP, Lashkar-e-Islam, and the BLA—or face continued aggression. This strategy aims to internationalize Pakistan’s internal conflicts, hoping regional powers like China, Qatar, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United States will pressure the Afghan Taliban to act against insurgents allegedly sheltered in Afghanistan. According to the 2020 Doha Agreement between the U.S. and the Afghan Taliban, Afghan soil must not be used for terrorism. Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey have brokered a fragile ceasefire, though efforts for permanent peace remain elusive. Meanwhile, BLA and TTP attacks continue unabated, and the Pakistan Army has reportedly resumed operations against Afghanistan.
It is worth remembering that the U.S. signed the Doha Agreement with the Afghan Taliban on February 29, 2020. Yet, the Taliban did not halt their campaign and ultimately defeated the Afghan National Army on August 15, 2021. Similarly, this new agreement may signal the beginning of Pakistan’s military collapse.
Pakistani officials have openly stated that the TTP and other anti-state groups are ideologically aligned with the Afghan Taliban. Pakistan has effectively shifted its internal war into Afghan territory, demanding that the Taliban guarantee an end to TTP attacks—or face further escalation. In response, the Afghan Taliban have repeatedly clarified that the 2020 Doha Agreement was signed between the U.S. and the Afghan Taliban, in which they guaranteed that no terrorist attacks would be planned from Afghan soil and that Afghanistan would not harbor or support anti-U.S. or anti-Western terrorist organizations. Pakistan, however, is not a signatory to that agreement.
Additionally, the Taliban have asserted that Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) have shifted operations to Pakistani Punjab and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), and that the TTP and BLA insurgencies are Pakistan’s internal matters. They have also accused Pakistan of supporting ISIS against Afghanistan. The Taliban have refused to fight Pakistan’s war and are expected to reiterate this stance in Doha. Under diplomatic and financial pressure from China, Qatar, and other Arab nations, Pakistan may be forced to halt its aggression.
Ultimately, the TTP and its associated groups are likely to intensify attacks within Pakistan, pushing the country further into chaos and military defeat. Pakistan’s attempt to force the Afghan Taliban into its internal conflict is likely to fail—just as its previous military ventures did: Operation Gibraltar in 1965 to occupy Jammu & Kashmir, the 1971 war to prevent disintegration, and the 1998 Kargil conflict to seize Siachen. Pakistan’s history is marked by repeated military failures.
Conclusion
The peace agreements facilitated by Qatar and Turkey do not favor Pakistan. A war between Afghanistan and Pakistan appears increasingly likely, as the Afghan Taliban are unlikely to fight Pakistan’s forced war against their ideological brethren, the TTP. Doing so would risk internal divisions among Taliban leadership and potentially ignite a civil war within Afghanistan—an outcome Pakistan may seek to exploit.
Pakistan’s military campaign in Afghanistan is designed to force the TTP and BLA into submission. However, Afghanistan’s long history of resisting foreign influence—from the Soviets to NATO—suggests it will not comply. Islamabad may escalate operations deeper into Afghan territory, risking a full-scale war.
There is also a growing possibility that Pakistan will provoke a confrontation with India—either to rally domestic support, distract from internal instability, or internationalize the conflict. This would mirror past attempts, such as the bombing of Srinagar military bases and the Battle of Longewala during the 1971 war, aimed at drawing international attention.
In this context, India and Afghanistan must strengthen their military cooperation. This includes sharing weapons and air defense systems, and jointly confronting Pakistan’s military through Operation Sindoor 2.0—engaging Pakistan on the eastern front in support of Afghanistan.
India should prepare contingency plans, including a calibrated expansion of Operation Sindoor 2.0—not only to safeguard its national interests but also to reclaim Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) before a potential collapse of the Pakistani state. If extremist groups like the TTP gain control of a nuclear-armed Pakistan, the threat would become significantly more dangerous and unpredictable. The insurgencies are expected to persist, with continued attacks on Pakistani military installations and the potential collapse of the Pakistan Army. Before jihadist groups conquer Islamabad, the U.S. and Western powers must act to neutralize Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal to prevent it from falling into extremist hands.
India should formally recognize the Afghan Taliban, as Russia has done, and deepen coordination with Kabul. New Delhi must also engage with secular Baloch nationalists—especially the BLA leadership—and support the establishment of a free, independent Balochistan. This would enhance long-term security for both India and Afghanistan. India has no option but to resume Operation Sindoor 2.0 in favor of Greater Afghanistan and a free Balochistan.
