By Fatima Baloch and Umesh Agarwal
Following the devastating Afghan civil war in 1992—engineered by Pakistan’s ISI through its support for Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, notoriously known as the “Butcher of Kabul”—Afghanistan plunged into chaos as Mujahideen factions fought for control of Kabul. Driven by the struggle for power, the conflict resulted in the mass destruction of Afghanistan’s well-developed Soviet-era infrastructure, displaced millions of people, and created a severe humanitarian catastrophe.
Between 1994 and 1996, Pakistan launched and supported the Tehreek Taliban Afghanistan (TTA) and backed the rise of the Afghan Taliban, largely composed of madrassa students from Pakistan, effectively replacing Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who had previously been its primary ally. By 1996, the Taliban had established a government in Kabul that was notably pro-Pakistan. Islamabad proudly viewed Afghanistan as its strategic depth against India, transforming the country into a hub for global militant organizations such as Al-Qaeda and anti-India Punjabi groups including Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT).
After the 9/11 attacks, Pakistan turned against the once pro-Pakistan TTA and allied with the United States and NATO in the global War on Terror. Islamabad gained the status of a Non-NATO ally and received substantial aid and development packages. Over the next two decades, Pakistan not only directly fought the TTA under the “do more” policy but also provided military support, airbases, and logistics to NATO and U.S. forces—operations that resulted in the deaths of thousands of Afghans.
During this period, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) emerged, ideologically aligned with the Afghan Taliban. Following the Taliban’s return to power on August 15, 2021, under the Doha Agreement, the TTP was emboldened to replicate the Taliban’s success by challenging the Pakistan Army and attempting to implement Islamic sharia law in Pakistan.
Unlike previous regimes—monarchist, communist, or externally imposed pseudo-democracies—the current Taliban-led government has brought relative stability to Afghanistan. As a tribal and Islamic society, many Afghans perceive the Taliban’s governance model as more closely aligned with their cultural and religious values. The TTA-led Afghanistan has curbed corruption, restored law and order, and reasserted national sovereignty, earning a degree of legitimacy and popular support, particularly in rural areas. Under Taliban leadership, Afghanistan is undergoing rapid development—a trajectory that challenges Pakistan’s traditional security calculus.
At the same time, nuclear-armed Pakistan continues to face a convergence of internal and external threats that mirror the fragmentation crisis of 1971. In Balochistan, the secular Baloch nationalist movement continues its struggle for independence under the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), seeking to establish a secular republic. Meanwhile, the TTP has gained significant ground in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), defeating Pakistani forces and aiming to replace the current pseudo-democratic Islamic Republic with an Afghan Taliban-style sharia regime.
The military’s popularity has sharply declined in Punjab—once its most loyal province—especially after the April 10, 2022 vote of no-confidence against PTI and the imprisonment of its most popular civilian leader, Imran Khan, who remains under severe detention while also facing health concerns. The crackdown on Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP), a previously favored hardline religious party used by the military to justify its policies in Balochistan and KPK, has further alienated key segments of society. These developments have significantly eroded public support for the Pakistan Army’s campaigns against the TTP and other militant groups. Simultaneously, Pakistan continues to grapple with severe economic instability and political disarray.
Despite efforts to suppress the BLA and TTP insurgencies—while suffering heavy casualties and the loss of high-ranking officers in frequent ambushes—the Pakistan Army has struggled to achieve decisive success. Years of conflict and politicized leadership have left the military exhausted and increasingly ineffective. The institution now faces severe internal strain, reminiscent of the collapse of the Afghan National Army under Ashraf Ghani. If Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal were ever to fall into the hands of jihadist groups such as the TTP, the consequences would be catastrophic, posing a serious global security threat, particularly to India, Israel, and the United States.
In response to these developments, Pakistan began blaming TTA-led Afghanistan, claiming that the Taliban government harbors anti-Pakistan militants such as the TTP and BLA in violation of the Doha Agreement. Islamabad also began promoting the narrative that anti-China, Tajikistan, and other regional militant groups—including ETIM, IMU, and ISIS-K—have safe havens inside Afghanistan, presenting them as a security risk for the region. These efforts appeared aimed at drawing Afghanistan’s neighboring countries into a broader confrontation with Kabul. However, these attempts largely remained unsuccessful while the Pakistani military continued to face growing internal security challenges.
Eventually, in October 14–15, 2025, Pakistan launched a large-scale military campaign against Afghanistan, targeting civilian infrastructure and populations. The objective of the operation was to pressure Kabul to fight Pakistan’s war against the TTP, Lashkar-e-Islam, and the BLA—or face continued aggression. Additionally, Pakistan attempted to internationalize its internal conflicts, hoping that regional powers such as China, Qatar, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United States would pressure the Afghan Taliban to act against insurgent groups allegedly operating from Afghan territory. Pakistani officials openly stated that the TTP and other anti-state groups are ideologically aligned with the TTA. Pakistan effectively attempted to shift its internal war into Afghan territory, demanding that the Taliban guarantee an end to TTP attacks or face further escalation.
In response, the Afghan Taliban government stated that the Doha Agreement was signed between the United States and the TTA and that Pakistan was neither a signatory nor a stakeholder in the agreement. Afghan authorities also argued that terrorist organizations such as JeM and LeT had shifted their operational bases to Pakistani Punjab and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), and that the TTP and BLA insurgencies were Pakistan’s internal matters. Therefore, Kabul rejected Pakistan’s demand to fight its war. Afghan officials also accused Pakistan of supporting ISIS elements against Afghanistan.
On October 28, 2025, a ceasefire agreement brokered by Qatar, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia temporarily halted hostilities. As a result, Pakistan’s military objectives remained largely unfulfilled while the country continued to face TTP and BLA insurgencies.
Under increasing internal pressure and fears of potential instability, Pakistan again launched another major military campaign against Afghanistan on February 27, 2026, under the codename Operation Ghazab-e-Ilhaq. Similar to the previous conflict, Pakistan’s primary objective appeared to be the internationalization of its internal conflicts and coercing the TTA to fight its war against the TTP and BLA. However, the TTA is unlikely to fight Pakistan’s war against their ideological counterparts, the TTP. Doing so would risk divisions within the Taliban leadership, provoke anger among ordinary Afghans, and potentially ignite a civil war within Afghanistan—an outcome Pakistan might seek to exploit.
Afghan decision-makers believe that long-term peace, development, and national security require resisting external interference and strengthening Afghanistan’s sovereignty. Consequently, developments involving groups such as the TTP in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa or the BLA in Balochistan could significantly reshape the regional balance of power and influence future security dynamics along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.
There is also a possibility that countries such as China and Turkey may once again intervene diplomatically to broker a ceasefire between Pakistan and Afghanistan, urging Pakistan to deal with the TTP and BLA independently while discouraging further military escalation against Afghanistan. However, attacks by the TTP and BLA are likely to continue, and Pakistan may continue to suffer significant losses. This situation could ultimately demonstrate the failure of Pakistan’s military objectives in Afghanistan.
Pakistan’s attempt to force the Afghan Taliban into its internal conflict may fail, just as several of its previous military ventures did—such as Operation Gibraltar in 1965 to occupy Jammu and Kashmir, the 1971 war that led to the creation of Bangladesh, and the 1999 Kargil conflict aimed at altering the status of Siachen. Pakistan’s strategic history is often marked by controversial and costly military miscalculations.
Conclusion
The Afghan Taliban-led government has indicated that it will not compromise Afghanistan’s sovereignty under external pressure. To defend its territorial integrity, the TTA has also conducted cross-border military operations along the Durand Line targeting Pakistani military positions. Meanwhile, the TTP and BLA have intensified their activities, further stretching Pakistan’s military resources by opening multiple fronts.
The ongoing Afghanistan–Pakistan tensions, combined with intensified insurgent activity in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, highlight Pakistan’s deepening internal and external challenges and underscore the broader strategic complexities facing South Asia. A Pakistan dominated by extremist militant groups could pose a serious threat to regional stability and to India’s security. Conversely, an independent and secular Balochistan could potentially emerge as a stabilizing regional partner.
India must maintain close diplomatic coordination with Afghanistan and provide military, financial, and economic support in response to Pakistan’s aggressive posture. Both sides should work together to counter destabilizing actions by Pakistan.The possible fragmentation of Pakistan and the emergence of an independent secular Republic of Balochistan could significantly reduce China’s strategic influence in the region, particularly affecting the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). India may therefore consider developing long-term strategic contingency plans regarding Pakistan, including the future of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), engagement with Baloch nationalist leadership, and deeper coordination with Afghanistan.
On the other hand, Pakistan continues its proxy war against India in Kashmir. Therefore, as demonstrated in 1971, the Indian Army must prepare for a strategic contingency (Ops 2.0) to safeguard its national security, particularly concerning the future of PoK before instability within Pakistan further complicates the situation. A Pakistan dominated by extremism would further destabilize South Asia, whereas a stable and secular Balochistan could potentially contribute to regional balance. Addressing these evolving geopolitical realities with strategic foresight could strengthen long-term security for both India and Afghanistan while reshaping the region’s strategic landscape.
About the Author
Fatima Baloch is a senior geopolitical and regional affairs analyst who writes extensively on Afghanistan, Balochistan, and India, focusing on regional security dynamics, insurgency movements, and South Asian strategic affairs.
Umesh Agarwal is a geopolitical expert, and a senior columnist associated with the digital news platform IndiaChronicle.
