On September 12, 2001, just after the 9/11 attacks, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell telephoned Pakistan’s President Pervez Musharraf with a stark ultimatum: Pakistan was “either with us or against us.” He warned that defiance could lead to being “bombed back to the Stone Age.” Under this pressure, Pakistan became a frontline U.S. ally against Afghanistan’s Taliban—an “Islamic brotherly country” that Pakistan had long considered its strategic depth against India.
Pakistan gained Non-NATO ally status and substantial aid, fighting the Taliban under the “do more” policy while simultaneously providing military support, airbases, and logistics to NATO forces—resulting in thousands of Afghan deaths. During this period, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) emerged, ideologically aligned with the Afghan Taliban.
Fast forward to December 21, 2025: backed by China and Turkey, Pakistan’s army chief issued a similar ultimatum to Taliban-led Afghanistan—“either with us or with the TTP.” This was not the first time Pakistan adopted a Powell-style threat. On September 14, 2025, while attending the funeral of 12 Pakistani military officials in Bannu, Defence Minister Khawaja Asif declared: “Afghanistan must choose between Pakistan and the TTP.” Other ministers echoed this rhetoric, insisting the Taliban would bow to Pakistan’s demands.
Yet history suggests otherwise. If the Taliban resisted two decades of U.S. and NATO military pressure after refusing to hand over Osama bin Laden, why would they now surrender to Pakistan’s coercion? Afghanistan has never bowed to superpowers—least of all to Pakistan. Throughout the U.S. occupation, the TTP remained ideologically aligned with the Afghan Taliban, sharing cultural and religious values. Thousands of their fighters were martyred in the fight against foreign forces. The Afghan Taliban understand that Pakistan is not the United States, and Afghans are not like Pakistanis.
The Taliban leadership knows that siding with Pakistan against their ideological brethren in the TTP would provoke resentment among Afghans and risk internal fractures—potentially igniting another civil war.
Pakistan’s Internal Crisis
Today, nuclear-armed Pakistan faces converging internal and external threats reminiscent of 1971. In Balochistan, the secular Baloch nation continues its struggle for independence under the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), seeking to establish a secular republic. Meanwhile, the TTP has gained significant ground in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), defeating Pakistani forces and aiming to replace the current pseudo-democratic Islamic Republic with an Afghan Taliban-style sharia government.
Despite China and Turkey’s direct involvement—providing drones and ammunition—the Pakistan Army continues to lose ground against both the TTP and BLA. Years of politicized leadership and prolonged conflict have left the military exhausted and ineffective, teetering on collapse reminiscent of the Afghan National Army’s downfall under Ashraf Ghani. The risk of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal falling into jihadist hands would be catastrophic for India, Israel, and the United States.
On October 14–15, 2025, Pakistan opened a new war front against Taliban-led Afghanistan, launching strikes across the border—including Kabul—aiming to force the Taliban to fight the TTP. Qatar and Saudi Arabia brokered ceasefires, leading to talks in Doha (October 18) and Istanbul (October 28), but both collapsed.
Regional Dynamics
Pakistan’s propaganda portraying Afghanistan as a terrorist haven—accusing the Taliban of harboring ETIM, IMU, and ISIS-K—failed to gain traction and instead threatened regional security. The objective of this narrative was to turn China, Iran, and Central Asian republics against the Afghan Taliban and in favor of Pakistan’s fight against the TTP and BLA. However, these countries rejected Pakistan’s claims.
Regional powers including China, Qatar, Iran, and Russia strengthened economic ties with Kabul. Unlike previous regimes, the Taliban-led government has brought relative stability. Many Afghans perceive its governance model as aligned with their cultural and religious values. The Taliban have curbed corruption, restored law and order, and reasserted sovereignty—earning legitimacy and popular support, particularly in rural areas.
Thus, where foreign-engineered governments failed, the nationalist and Islamic-valued Afghan Taliban 2.0 stands as a legitimate authority. Today, Qatar, Turkey, Iran, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, China, and Russia recognize and support the Taliban government.
Turkey fears Pakistan’s collapse and the emergence of an independent Balochistan, which could resonate with Kurdish separatism. Similarly, China—long supportive of Pakistan’s military against the Baloch—fears that an independent, secular, and democratic Balochistan would become an anti-China force in the region.
Meanwhile, Pakistan’s army is desperately seeking Afghan factions to fight against the Taliban-led government. Yet Afghans widely perceive Pakistan as untrustworthy, and no Afghan leaders have responded. The Taliban, wary of U.S. influence and Pakistani interference, increasingly view support for the TTP’s pro-Afghanistan agenda—and the Baloch struggle for a Greater Afghanistan (Loy Afghanistan)—as essential to safeguarding sovereignty.
Conclusion
Turkey and China have once again stepped in to protect the Pakistan Army, pledging drones and ammunition against the TTP and BLA. Yet the Afghan Taliban remain unwilling to fight their ideological brethren. Doing so risks internal divisions, public backlash, and even civil war—an outcome Pakistan may seek to exploit. Pakistan will continue suffering TTP and BLA ambushes and may ultimately escalate into a full-fledged war against the Afghan Taliban, seeking international intervention to guarantee security from insurgents.
India must prepare contingency plans, including reclaiming Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) before a potential collapse of the Pakistani state. This would make India a contiguous neighbor of Afghanistan and grant direct access to Central Asia. Strategically, India should formally recognize the Taliban government—as Russia has already done—and deepen coordination with Kabul.
To neutralize Chinese and Turkish influence, New Delhi must engage secular Baloch nationalists, particularly the BLA leadership, to support the establishment of a free, independent Balochistan. The disintegration of Pakistan would dismantle CPEC’s corridor through PoK and establish a pro-India, anti-China secular republic in the region. Simultaneously, India should encourage Afghanistan to absorb Pakistan’s Pashtun province (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), merging it into a Greater Afghanistan.
Such steps would secure long-term stability for both India and Afghanistan. Notably, nationalist figures within the Afghan Taliban reportedly maintain cordial relations with Baloch freedom fighters. The Baloch are part of Afghanistan’s ethnic mosaic, with Nimroz being a Baloch-majority province that remained peaceful during the Soviet intervention (1978–89), Afghan civil war (1990–96), and the U.S./NATO occupation (2001–2021). Afghan Baloch leadership consistently negotiated with Herat’s prominent Islamist commander Ismail to avoid internal conflict and resolve state matters amicably. As a result, civil war was avoided in August 2021 during the U.S. withdrawal.
Today, Afghan Baloch hold key positions in the Taliban’s political and military structures. Some are said to support Baloch nationalists seeking independence. Pakistan’s past interference has contributed to the serious security challenges it now faces. Historically, Baloch migrants and BLA freedom fighters from Pakistan-occupied Balochistan have remained neutral in Afghan politics and internal conflicts, earning respect and solidarity.
About the Author
Fatima Baloch is a senior geopolitical and regional expert who writes extensively on Afghanistan, Balochistan, and India, with a focus on strategic dynamics and regional security.
