For Pakistan, a strong, independent, and nationalist Afghanistan has long been perceived as a strategic threat. Islamabad has feared that such a government could reignite Pashtun nationalism—reviving calls for an independent Pashtunistan or a merger with Afghanistan—challenge the legitimacy of the Durand Line, and potentially support Baloch separatism. This would threaten Pakistan’s territorial integrity from both the west (Pashtunistan) and the south (Balochistan).
Based on this perception, Pakistan has long believed that a politically stable, militarily capable, and economically developed Afghanistan could eventually challenge its territorial structure—potentially leading to further fragmentation similar to the events of 1971. As a result, Pakistan has rarely maintained a well-evaluated and constructive Afghan policy and instead began intervening in Afghanistan’s internal political affairs by supporting anti-government militants and rival factions. In the 1970s, it supported opposition groups against King Zahir Shah and later President Daud Khan, fueling factionalism and instability. During the Soviet-Afghan War (1979–1989), Pakistan—under military and financial support from the United States and Saudi Arabia—trained thousands of Mujahideen fighters. Its strategic objectives included gaining financial assistance, acquiring military equipment, strengthening its strategic position, and weakening Afghanistan.
Even after the 1988 Geneva Accords and the Soviet withdrawal, Pakistan continued to influence Afghanistan’s internal conflict—launching attacks on Jalalabad through Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s faction in an attempt to topple Dr. Najibullah’s government. The resulting civil war devastated the country and displaced millions.
Between 1994 and 1996, Pakistan backed the rise of the Afghan Taliban, largely composed of madrassa students from Pakistan, effectively replacing Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who had previously been its main ally. Through religious mobilization and ideological influence, Islamabad reshaped parts of Pashtun political identity, transforming previously secular nationalist movements into more radicalized and pro-Pakistan factions, often referred to within Pashtun society as “Gul Khan.”
After the September 11 attacks in 2001, Pakistan became a frontline ally of the United States and NATO against the Taliban, receiving the status of a Major Non-NATO Ally and substantial financial and military assistance. Over the next two decades, Pakistan officially fought the Taliban under international pressure while simultaneously providing airbases, logistics, and intelligence support to NATO forces—contributing to a prolonged conflict that resulted in significant Afghan casualties.
During this period, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) emerged, ideologically aligned with the Afghan Taliban and opposed to both NATO forces and Pakistan’s Western-backed governments. At the same time, the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), a secular Baloch nationalist movement, intensified its armed struggle for an independent and democratic Balochistan. The Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan in 2021 emboldened the TTP to attempt to replicate their success and challenge the Pakistani state.
Today, nuclear-armed Pakistan faces converging internal and external pressures reminiscent of the period leading up to 1971. In Balochistan, the BLA continues its insurgency for independence, while the TTP has expanded its presence in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, challenging Pakistani security forces and advocating the establishment of a Taliban-style Islamic system.
Currently, the Pakistan Army is confronting simultaneous insurgencies and guerrilla warfare from the TTP in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the BLA in Balochistan. Years of conflict, internal political pressures, and strategic overextension have strained the military’s capacity. In an attempt to internationalize its internal security challenges, Pakistan has sought diplomatic and strategic engagement with countries such as Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and China to establish a cooperative framework against the TTP and BLA.
As part of this effort—and with the objective of pressuring Afghanistan’s Taliban government to take action against the TTP—Pakistan conducted several cross-border operations and airstrikes inside Afghanistan. These actions ultimately escalated into a full-scale military confrontation on October 14–15, 2025. However, Pakistan’s strategic objectives were not achieved. China, Qatar, Iran, and Saudi Arabia reportedly intervened diplomatically to prevent further escalation.
A ceasefire was brokered with the involvement of Qatar, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, yet Pakistan continued to face persistent insurgent attacks by both the TTP and BLA. On February 27, 2026, Pakistan—again acting as the initiating side—launched another major military campaign under the codename Operation Ghazab-e-Ilhaq against Afghanistan. Similar to the previous conflict, Pakistan’s key objective appears to be the internationalization of its internal conflicts and the coercion of the Afghan Taliban into confronting the TTP, which remains ideologically close to them.
If the Afghan Taliban were to take up arms against the TTP—who fought alongside them against the United States and NATO for nearly two decades—it could provoke internal dissent and public anger within Afghanistan. Pakistan might attempt to exploit such instability to trigger a civil war in Afghanistan similar to that of 1992.
Afghan Taliban leaders and policymakers are aware that Pakistan has historically been influenced by external powers and has repeatedly intervened in Afghanistan’s internal affairs, often exploiting periods of political and military weakness to shape outcomes favorable to its strategic interests. From this perspective, Afghan decision-makers believe that long-term peace, development, and national security require resisting external interference and strengthening Afghanistan’s sovereignty. Therefore, support for movements such as the TTP in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa or the BLA in Balochistan could significantly reshape the regional balance of power and influence future security dynamics across the Afghanistan-Pakistan border regions.
Conclusion and Strategic Outlook
Countries such as Qatar, China, and Turkey understand Pakistan’s evil military objectives and its efforts to pressure the Afghan Taliban into joining Pakistan’s conflict against the TTP and BLA. These countries may once again intervene diplomatically to broker a ceasefire between Pakistan and Afghanistan and encourage Pakistan to address its internal security challenges without escalating cross-border tensions or attacking Afghanistan.
However, insurgent attacks by the TTP and BLA are likely to continue with similar intensity, potentially placing further strain on Pakistan’s security forces in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan.
If China, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey choose not to intervene—either due to involvement in a potential U.S.–Iran confrontation or because of Pakistan’s diplomatic assurances—the regional situation could become even more complex. In such circumstances, India might consider strengthening its strategic posture along the eastern border in order to safeguard its national security interests, drawing historical parallels to the geopolitical environment preceding the events of 1971.
Within the broader context of Pakistan–Afghanistan tensions, Pakistan’s long-standing proxy rivalry with India further complicates the situation. Pakistan’s political instability, economic challenges, and ongoing internal conflicts with the TTP and BLA, combined with China’s strategic investments through the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and disputes related to Pakistan-administered Kashmir and the Shaksgam Valley, add additional complexity to the regional geopolitical landscape. India, therefore, cannot ignore these developments and will likely continue reassessing its strategic options in order to safeguard its national interests.
The potential fragmentation of Pakistan and the emergence of new political entities—such as an independent Balochistan—could significantly reshape regional geopolitics and potentially weaken China’s strategic influence in the region. In such a scenario, regional powers may reconsider their long-term strategic alignments and security policies. Historical precedents demonstrate that major geopolitical transformations often emerge during periods of prolonged instability.
A destabilized Pakistan dominated by internal extremism could further disrupt South Asian security, whereas new regional arrangements and political settlements could open pathways for more stable cooperation between neighboring states. Ultimately, Pakistan’s decades-long policy of regional interference has played a significant role in shaping many of the crises it faces today.
About the Author
Fatima Baloch is a senior geopolitical and regional analyst who writes extensively on Afghanistan, Balochistan, and India, focusing on strategic dynamics, regional security, and
